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Highlights
• The financial crisis modified drastically and rapidly the European fi-
nancial system’s political economy, with the emergence of two com-
peting narratives. First, government agencies are frequently described
as being at the mercy of the financial sector, routinely hijacking poli-
tical, regulatory and supervisory processes, a trend often referred to
as “capture”. But alternatively, governments are portrayed as sub-
verting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit,
mainly to secure better financing conditions and allocate credit to the
economy on preferential terms, referred to as “financial repression”. 
• We take a critical look at this debate in the European context. First,
we argue that the relationship between governments and financial
systems in Europe cannot be reduced to polar notions of “capture”
and “repression”, but that channels of pressure and influence bet-
ween governments and their financial systems have frequently run
both ways and fed from each other. Second, we put these issues
into an historical perspective and show that the current reconfigu-
ration of Europe’s national financial systems is influenced by his-
tory but is not a return to past interventionist policies. We conclude
by analysing the impact of the reform of the European financial ar-
chitecture and the design of a European banking union on the confi-
guration of national financial ecosystems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has  
been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory  
reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to 
governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running 
between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life  
to  concepts  originating  from  academic  debates  of  the  1970s  such  as  “regulatory  capture”  and 
“financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of  
the financial  sector,  often allowing financial  interests to hijack  political,  regulatory and supervisory 
processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good 1. An opposite view has 
instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and  
abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to  
overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the 
economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of  
some of its participants2.
But a closer look at the experience of European countries suggests that both the notion of “capture” and 
“repression” are too narrow to describe the complex relationship between financial stakeholders and  
their  national  governments.  Instead,  the  history  of  European  financial  systems  reveals  how  
governments, central banks, public sector banks and financial institutions have historically been part  
of  deeply  interconnected  European  financial  ecosystems  bound  both  by  political  and  financial  
relations.  Patterns of pressures and influence within these financial ecosystems have always run in 
both directions and have been mutually reinforcing.
As Andrew Shonfield argued in 1965 in one of the first detailed analyses of the role of governments and  
1 Baxter has defined capture as occurring “whenever a particular sector of the industry, subject to the regulatory regime, 
has acquired persistent influence disproportionate to the balance of interests envisaged when the regulatory system 
was established”. Lawrence G. Baxter (2011) 'Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Redirect It Toward the Common 
Good?' Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 175-200. The origins of the concept: see George J. Stigler (1971) 'The 
Theory of Economic Regulation', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1. See also Dal Bó, 
Ernesto (2006) 'Regulatory Capture: A Review', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 203–225.  For a recent 
discussion of the problem of capture in the context of the financial crisis see Carpenter, Daniel and David A. Moss (eds) 
(2013) Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it, Cambridge University Press; 
Johnson, Simon (2009) 'The Quiet Coup', Atlantic Monthly, May; and Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2012) 
‘Captured Europe’, Project Syndicate, May, available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/captured-europe.
2 Reinhart, Carmen. M. (2012) 'The return of financial repression', Financial Stability Review, 16, 37-48; Kirkegaard, Jacob 
F. and Carmen M Reinhart (2012) 'Financial repression, then and now', VoxEU.org, May; Allianz Global Investors (2013) 
Financial Repression. It Is Happening Already, available at:
https://www.allianzglobalinvestors.de/cms-out/kapitalmarktanalyse/docs/pdf-eng/analysis-and-trends-financial-
repression-it-is-happening-already.pdf.
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of the “balance of public and private power” in western capitalism after WWII, these different financial 
ecosystems  in  Europe  varied  across  countries  because  of  different  histories  and  institutions  that  
framed such relationships3. These national differences have frequently been presented as declining 
with time and in response to deeper financial integration. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system  
in the early 1970s, the removal of restrictions to the circulation of capital within Europe following the 
1986 Single European Act, the creation of the single currency, and the process initiated in 2001 by the  
European Commission with the Lamfalussy Report to extend the single market to financial services  
have fostered a greater integration of banking and financial activities across national borders that have 
profoundly altered existing national ecosystems4. The response to the euro-area crisis seems to have 
further  encouraged  this  trend,  and  new  institutional  mechanisms,  in  particular  the  creation  of  a 
European banking union, typically aims at Europeanising further banking supervision and resolution 
thereby potentially reducing further the weight of national historical and institutional idiosyncrasies.
However, claims suggesting the end of national financial ecosystems in Europe are at best premature.  
This  paper  discusses  how  national  financial  ecosystems  in  Europe  continue  in  fact  to  exercise  a  
significant  influence over financial  policy-making and how the transition towards a more integrated 
financial  framework (ie  banking union) influences these  relations.  Our  conjecture is  that  the rapid  
reversal of financial integration and a re-domestication of financial flows and financial risks triggered 
by the crisis5 have built on practices, ties and institutions that have deep historical roots. Meanwhile,  
the European policy response, which intended to repair financial fragmentation and recreate a more  
integrated financial sector has attempted to Europeanise the regulation, supervision, resolution of the 
financial  sector  thereby  trying  to  break  historical  ties  within  national  financial  ecosystems.  It  is  
therefore important to take a critical look at these opposite movements and they way they affect not 
3 Andrew Schonfield (1965) Modern capitalism: The changing balance of public and private power, Oxford University 
Press. A subsequent literature in political sciences has coined the term “varieties of capitalism” to study these 
differences and their institutional roots: Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds) (1997) The Political Economy of 
Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage; Peter A. Hall, David Soskice (eds) (2001) 
Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press.
4 De Larosière Jacques (2009) Report on financial supervision to the European Commission; Mügge, Daniel (2006) 
'Reordering the Marketplace: Competition Politics in European Finance', Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(5), 991–
1022.
5 For the literature on financial retrenchment globally see for example Lund, Susan et al (2013) Financial globalization: 
retreat or reset? McKinsey, available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/global_capital_markets/financial_globalization; Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria and Cedric 
Tille (2011) 'The Great Retrenchment: International Capital Flows during the Global Financial Crisis', Economic Policy vol. 
26(4), pp. 285-342. Re-nationalisation of financial intermediation and financial policy has emerged as a response to the 
contradiction between international market integration and spatially limited political mandates, as highlighted in the 
political science literature: Pontusson, J. and Raess, D. (2012) 'How (and Why) Is This Time Different? The Politics of 
Economic Crisis in Western Europe and the United States', Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 13-33; Clift, B. and 
Woll, C. (2012) 'Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets', Journal of European Public Policy, 19(3), 
307-323; Schmidt, V. A. and Thatcher, M. (eds) (2013) Resilient liberalism in Europe's political economy, Cambridge 
University Press.
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only the efficacy of capital allocation and credit intermediation at the national level, but also the policy-
making process at the European level.
2. BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS: COMPETING NARRATIVES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC
Attitudes  towards  the  relationship  between  governments  and  national  financial  institutions  have  
historically varied significantly across the United States and Europe. Suspicions over the involvement  
of politically powerful banks in the political system have been an integral part of the US political debate.  
These can be traced as far back as the controversy between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson  
about  the  establishment  of  the  First  Bank  of  the  United  States  in  17916.  More  recently,  many 
commentators  seeking  to  explain  the  regulatory  failures  at  the  origin  of  the  financial  crisis  have  
repeatedly pointed the finger towards the political clout of financial lobbies. The Report by the Financial  
Crisis Inquiry Commission established by the US Congress to investigate the roots of the crisis found  
that: “the financial industry itself played a key role in weakening regulatory constraints on institutions,  
markets, and products”.   The Commission explained this influence by making reference to the $2.7 
billion in federal lobbying expenses and $1 billion in campaign contributions spent by the financial 
sector  between  1999  and  20087.  Others  have  highlighted  how  the  role  of  the  preferential  access 
allowed by the “revolving doors” between Wall Street and US regulatory agencies8.
The perception of financial industry groups capable to often act as rule-makers has brought a number 
of  commentators  to  analyse  the  relationship  between  US  financial  firms  and  the  political  system 
through the lenses of “regulatory capture”. The origins of the term are usually attributed to the work of  
George Stigler in the early 1970s but this concept has been brought to the fore by Simon Johnson,  
former IMF chief economist, and other commentators during the recent financial crisis9.
This description of the financial industry as systematically “capturing” the design and implementation  
financial regulatory reforms has however resonated more broadly in the US than across the Atlantic.  
This is in part the result of the fact that the focus of most US-centric analyses on financial resources,  
campaign contributions and revolving doors as means through which the financial industry is capable  
6 Goldstein, Morris and Veron, Nicolas (2011) 'Too Big to Fail: The Transatlantic Debate', Working Paper No. 11-2, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics; Johnson, Simon and Kwak, James (2011) 13 bankers: the Wall Street takeover 
and the next financial meltdown, Vintage.
7 FCIC (2011) The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States. Washington, DC: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. See also Johnson, 
Simon (2009) 'The Quiet Coup', Atlantic Monthly, May.
8 US GAO (2011) 'Securities and Exchange Commission. Existing Post-Employment Controls Could be Further 
Strengthened', Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-654 Report, Washington DC.
9 Stigler (1971). See footnote 1.
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to routinely “buy” regulatory policies does not sit comfortably with the experience of most European 
countries, where political party financing and electoral rules limit the importance of financial resources 
in buying political support, while bureaucrats in financial regulatory agencies and central banks are  
more likely to spend most of their career in the public sector. 
Campaign  contributions and revolving doors  are  not  the only  channels  through  which the interest  
groups are capable to capture the policy-making process. On the contrary, while theories of regulatory  
capture  developed  from  the  US  experience  have  focused  on  the  resources that  different  financial  
groups are capable of deploying in the lobbying of the US Congress or federal regulatory authorities, the 
European experience is illustrative of the wider and often less visible channels through financial which 
banks often influence the design of financial policies. A number of structural characteristics of different 
financial  ecosystems in Europe have bolstered the influence of European banks over the design of 
financial policies. These include for instance the formal and informal links between the political system  
and the banking system. For instance, German public saving banks (Sparkassen and Landesbanken) 
that held some 33 percent of the assets of the German Banking  sector in 2009 remain owned and 
controlled by regional  governments10,  which naturally  create a peculiar  relationship.  In Italy,  state-
owned banks have been privatised over the last few decades, but many of these institutions remain  
still today under the influence or control of foundations (“fondazioni bancarie”) that maintain close ties 
with the political system and in some cases are directly appointed by political parties11. In Spain, small 
and medium size  Cajas remained partly  owned by the public  and largely under the influence and  
control of regional officials and religious leaders, thus weakening the hand of the central government in  
supervising and regulating them and favouring undue forbearance by the central  authorities.  These 
formal ties are frequently reinforced by informal ties, such as the social  networks embedded in the 
French  Grandes écoles where future civil servants, politicians and bankers are trained together and 
come to form networks of influence organises around the  Grands Corps12. These formal and informal 
ties between the political system and the banking system make banks particularly receptive to political 
guidance at the local, state and federal level but also allow these institutions to exercise a significant  
10 The Landesbanken are themselves partly owned by regional confederations of Sparkassen (saving banks) and 
respective federal states.  See also Grossman Emiliano (2006) 'Europeanisation as an interactive process: German 
public banks meet EU competition policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, n°2, p. 325-347.
11 Giani, Leonardo (2008) ‘Ownership and Control of Italian Banks: A Short Inquiry into the Roots of the Current Context', 
Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 87-98.
12 On the role of these networks for banking reforms, see Butzbach Olivier, Grossman Emiliano (2004) 'La réforme de la 
politique bancaire en France et en Italie : le rôle ambigu de l’instrumentation de l’action publique', in L’instrumentation 
de l’action publique (sous la dir. de Pierre Lascoumes et Patrick Le Galès), Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, pp. 301-330. 
More general references are Swartz, David (1985) 'French Interlocking Directorships: Financial and Industrial Groups', in 
Stokman, Ziegler and Scott (eds) Networks of Corporate Powers: A Comparative Analysis of Ten Countries; Kadushin, 
Charles (1995) 'Friendship Among the French Financial Elite', American Sociological Review, Vol 60, N_2, pp 202-221. 
For a quantitative approach highlighting the role of networks of former high ranking civil servants in shaping board 
composition of banks and other corporations, see Kramarz, Francis and Thesmar, David (2013) 'Social networks in the 
boardroom', Journal of the European Economic Association, 11:780–807.
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influence over the regulatory process through their political connections. 
Another characteristics of the European financial systems that is often ignored by US-centric analysis 
of regulatory capture is the greater reliance of European countries on bank credit for financing the real  
economy as well  as sovereign debt.  This structural feature of European financial  systems,  gives to 
banks rather than other financial intermediaries a particular importance and creates channels through  
which national financial  institutions are likely to gain leverage over policy makers. As Cornelia Woll  
argues, “decision-makers will act in favour of the industry because they need finance for funding the  
so-called  real  economy,  for  funding  the government  and as a  motor  for  growth” 13.  These  kinds of 
relations also explain why even without strong pressures by the financial industry, governments feel 
compelled to consider that the interest of the financial sector are aligned with those of the economy  
and the country as a whole. For example, Sir Howard Davies, the first Chair of the UK Financial Services 
Authority explained how during the pre crisis period “on the whole, banks [in the UK] did not have to  
lobby politicians, largely because politicians argued the case for them without obvious inducement”14. 
Indeed,  some of  the same dynamics have been fully  in display during the response to the global  
financial crisis when concerns about the potential impact of regulation on banks balance sheets and 
possible consequences on the extension of credit to the economy have brought politicians in a number  
of  European  countries  to  support  the  demands  from  their  financial  industry  to  water  down  these 
regulatory measures. The greater success of European banking lobbies in having their demands met 
during the implementation of Basel III at the European level has clearly been influenced by the link with  
the real economy that the financial industry was able to establish 15. Indeed, financial industry lobbies 
seem to have achieved concessions conditional on their capacity to highlight the impact of different  
pieces of regulation over their capacity to provide credit to the broader economy 16. At the same time, 
the  watering down  of  key  regulatory  requirements  has  been  accompanied  by  repeated  calls  from 
European politicians towards banks which were asked to commit to increase credit to the domestic  
economy.
Overall, the experience of recent banking regulatory reforms in Europe are indicative not only of the fact 
that the significant political influence of banks is not uniquely a US phenomena. On the contrary, the  
13 Woll, Cornelia (2013) 'The power of banks', Speri, University of Sheffield, July.
14 Davies, Howard (2010) 'Comments on Ross Levine’s paper “The governance of financial regulation: reform lessons from 
the recent crisis”', Bank for International Settlements; see also The Warwick Commission on International Financial 
Reform (2009) In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields, University of Warwick.
15 Howarth, David and Quaglia, Lucia (2013) 'Banking on Stability: The Political Economy of New Capital Requirements in 
the European Union', Journal of European Integration (May), 37–41.
16 Pagliari, Stefano and Young, Kevin L. (2014) 'Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector 
coalitions', Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), 575–610. 
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influence of European banks over the design of financial policies frequently arises from a number of  
structural  characteristics  of  the  different  financial  ecosystems  in  which  they  find  themselves  
operating.  But  shifting  the  focus  from  the  direct  lobbying  of  financial  institutions  towards  the  
characteristics of different financial ecosystems in Europe also reveals a further corrective to notion of 
‘capture’ that has frequently been used to interpret the relationship between banks and government 
agencies. While many US-centric have focused on the influence of financial actors and other interest  
groups over the state, channels of pressure and influence between European governments and their  
banking system within distinct  European financial  ecosystems have frequently been presented as 
running  both  ways  and  feeding  from  each  other.  These  reciprocal  channels  of  influence  between  
European governments and their banking systems will be explored in the next section by looking at  
modern European history.
3. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEMS 
Examples of this symbiotic relationship between European governments and their  financial  system 
abound throughout modern European history.  European governments have indeed frequently used 
banks to expand and broaden their reach over the economy either domestically or internationally. The 
creation of Deutsche Bank in 1870 in the context of the formation of the German Empire and the need 
to challenge the leadership of British banks in the global markets, as well as the creation of public  
credit  institutions  in  Italy  and  France  to  support  national  financial  development  or  postwar 
reconstructions are only some of the many examples throughout modern European history of the way  
through which financial nationalism and The promotion of “national banking champions” was also often 
intended to allow competition with European neighbours and the projection of power internationally to  
accompany the internationalisation of domestic firms17. 
The involvement of the State in financial  developments in the nineteenth century went beyond the  
promotion of international champions.  During this period, financial  liberalisation went hand in hand 
with  the  promotion  of  national  credit  and  state  intervention.  Governments  were  indeed  keen  on  
rescuing  banks  in  order  to  save  bankers  interests  as  well  as  the  financing  of  the  economy,  and 
personal connections between politicians and bankers were crucial to this process18. Central banks − 
which were still at the time institutions with private shareholders granted with a monopoly on the right  
17 Morris and Veron (2011), see footnote 6. Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic backwardness in historical perspective. 
Economic backwardness in historical perspective, Harvard University Press.
18 Hautcoeur, Pierre Cyrille, Riva Angelo, and White Eugene N. (2013) 'Can Moral Hazard Be Avoided? The Banque de France 
and the Crisis of 1889', paper presented at the 82nd Meeting of the Carnegie-Rochester-NYU Conference on Public 
Policy; Caroline Fohlin (2012) Mobilizing Money: How the World’s Richest Nations Financed Industrial Growth, New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
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to issue − were perfect examples of these connections between governments and financial capitalism  
that developed throughout the nineteenth century. European governments or monarchs also exerted 
controls  on  some  large  credit  institutions  that  were  crucial  for  the  financing  needs  and  debt 
repayments of local authorities, as the Caisse des Dépôts and Crédit Foncier in France and the Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti in Italy.
For  a  long  period,  the  collusion  between  State  and  banks  went  hand  in  hand  with  significant  
government interference in the activities of financial firms in order to channel and allocate credit in a  
non-competitive way. But the controls of the State over financial systems strongly increased after the  
Great Crash throughout the 1930s in democratic and dictatorships alike, and were reinforced after the 
second world war with bank nationalisations and the increasing role given to public credit institutions.
Also in the years following the end of the second world war, western European governments continued 
to  strategically  directs  their  domestic  banking  system  towards the  achievement  of  specific  public  
policy objectives. The term “financial repression” − coined in the early 1970s to describe developing 
economies in Asia and Latin America19 − has been used retrospectively to indicate a wide range of 
targeted prudential controls and requirements such as capital controls, reserve requirements, capital  
requirements,  and  various  taxes  and  levies  to  favour  –  directly  or  indirectly  –  the  holding  of  
government debt. In addition, over the same period, interventionist credit policies were developed to  
influence the allocation of credit through price or quantity rules so as to offer a competitive advantage  
to certain economic sectors. A key feature of these interactions during this period was to force financial  
institutions  to  extend  credit  that  would  otherwise  have  to  be  funded  by  government  deficits 
expenditures20. This alternative financing of state intervention contained public debt while introducing 
political  pressures  and  "distortions"  of  competition  in  the  financial  sector.  Banks  were  sometimes  
requested  to  hold  a  certain  amount  of  government  bonds  and  of  claims  on  certain  sectors  as  a  
percentage of their total asset. The same outcomes could also be pursued indirectly by central banks in 
their design of monetary policy operations (reserve requirements, credit ceilings, liquidity ratios) and 
through collateral  policy facilitating  banks access to  the discount  window for  certain  categories  of  
claims.  The  intervention  of  governments in  the  working  of  their  respective  domestic  markets  also  
frequently occurred through the development of public credit institutions as substitutes to banks and 
19 McKinnon, Ronald (1973) Money and capital in economic development, Brookings Institution Press.
20 Hodgman Battilossi, Stefano (2005) 'The Second Reversal: The ebb and flow of financial repression in Western Europe, 
1960-91', Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Monnet, Eric (2014) 'The diversity in national 
monetary and credit policies in Western Europe under Bretton Woods', in Central banks and the nation states, O.Feiertag 
and M.Margairaz (eds), Paris, Sciences Po, forthcoming; Monnet, Eric (2013) 'Financing a planned economy, institutions 
and credit allocation in the French golden age of growth (1954-1974)', BEHL Working Paper n°2, University of Berkeley; 
Hodgman, Donald (1973) 'Credit controls in Western Europe: An evaluative review', Credit Allocation Techniques and 
Monetary Policy, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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through the direct investment of Western European governments  in some specific sectors (housing,  
agriculture, industry etc) and support industrial policies or resort to the development of state-owned 
credit institutions or public banks as substitutes to banks
All in all, these policies were used – at different degrees across countries– to control risk in the banking  
sector,  to  support  industrial  policy,  facilitate  government-financing  needs  and  control  inflationary 
risks21.
These tools also shared a strong national bias; most savings, investments, government financing came  
from domestic sources and financial regulation aimed to mitigate risks and influence the allocation of  
credit  at  the  national  level.  As  a  consequence,  the  political  economy  of  these  systems  relied  on 
connections and coordination22 at the national level between government agencies, public and private 
lending  institutions  and  industries.  Employees  circulated  easily  and  frequently  between  public 
administrations  and  nationalised  firms  or  banks.  In  the  name  of  the  public  interest,  industries  
negotiated with governments in order to receive subsidies, to be given priority, and sometimes to be 
rescued23.
It  is  only in  the late  1970s and 1980s,  that  these symbiotic  relations between Western European 
governments and their national banking systems approach were challenged by profound intellectual  
changes  about  the  merits  of  financial  liberalisation  and  independent  central  banking and that  the 
negative effects of governments interventions (unproductive rents, crowding out, over-saving by state  
owned  institutions)  became  more  central  to  economic  thinking and policymaking.  As a  result,  the 
recourse  to  these  interventions  and  instruments  gradually  but  rapidly  vanished.  Countries  –
prominently France– experienced a radical liberalisation in the mid 1980s and all converged towards  
and open financial system with a mature money market in the early 1990s. 
As a result of this new settlement, financial ecosystems were organically but deeply redesigned, and  
as a result,  financial  and political  relationships were recomposed. The expansion and deepening of  
21 Monnet Eric (2012) 'Monetary policy without interest rates. Evidence from France’s Golden Age (1948-1973) using a 
narrative approach', Working Papers 0032, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
22 Eichengreen, Barry (2008) The European economy since 1945: coordinated capitalism and beyond, Princeton 
University Press.
23 Pontusson & Raess (2012) 'How (and Why) Is This Time Different? The Politics of Economic Crisis in Western Europe and 
the United States', Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 15, pp. 13-33; Zysman, John (1983) Governments, markets, 
and growth: financial systems and the politics of industrial change, Cornell University Press. The academic literature 
that builds on the “varieties of capitalism” has studied extensively how these national characteristics and “institutional 
complementarities” were shaped and reinforced by the role of the state, then shaping these various forms of 
“capitalism”. Schonfield, A. (1965) Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power, Oxford 
University Press. Peter Katzenstein (1985) Small States in World Markets, Ithaca, Cornell University Press; Peter Hall, 
David Soskice (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford University Press.
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cross border capital flows supported further financial market openness, independence of central banks 
and disengagement from the public sector24.
In sum, while  distinct  financial  ecosystems characterised  by symbiotic  relationship  and reciprocal  
patterns of influence between governments and their banking industry have exercised a significant  
influence in the past, these differences have frequently been presented as in decline at the turn of the 
century. The question remains whether the current crisis has interrupted this decline and reinvigorated  
past behaviours and historical relationships? 
4. THE EUROPEAN CRISIS AND THE RECOMPOSITION OF NATIONAL ECOSYSTEMS
The abrupt  interruption in  cross border capital  movement has triggered a clear  renationalisation  of  
finance over the last  three years and has profoundly modified relations between national financial  
systems and governments in Europe25. The vast and ubiquitous use of government expenditures and 
guarantees  to  support  the  financial  system26 has  been  followed  by  widespread  calls  for  tighter 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector as a whole and of the banking sector in particular. In  
addition, in many instances, the crisis has unsettled governments' access to financial  markets and 
increased their borrowing cost. The economic downturn has in turn woken up a certain desire and a 
need to address credit shortages and intervene more forcefully in the financial system to improve and  
augment the extension of credit and facilitate the recovery. However, if governments in Europe have 
not resorted completely and openly to the policies and instruments that had characterised the Bretton  
Woods era, a number of developments could indicate a redefinition of the relations between the public  
and the financial sector along the lines of pre-existing historical relations and behaviours.
The most common and clearly identified aspect of these changing landscapes is the extent to which 
holdings  of  public  debt  have  been  on  balance  re-nationalised.  Debt  sustainability  concerns,  
uncertainty about the integrity of the European monetary union and the reluctance of the central bank  
to address risks of multiple equilibria in sovereign debt markets in the euro area 27 have all contributed 
to put sovereign debt markets under strain and forced governments to rely on national savings and 
24 Mügge, Daniel (2006) 'Reordering the Marketplace: Competition Politics in European Finance', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 44(5), 991–1022.
25 Carmen Reinhart (2012) 'The return of financial repression', CEPR, DP8947; Sapir, André, and Wolff, Guntram  (2013) 'The 
neglected side of banking union: reshaping Europe’s financial system', Policy Contribution, Bruegel; Goodhart, Charles 
(2013) 'Lessons for monetary policy from the Euro-area crisis', Journal of Macroeconomics.
26 Stolz, S. M., and Wedow, M. (2010) 'Extraordinary measures in extraordinary times: Public measures in support of the 
financial sector in the EU and the United States', Occasional Paper 117, European Central Bank.
27 De Grauwe, Paul (2011) 'The European Central Bank: Lender of last resort in the government bond markets?' CESifo 
working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance (No. 3569). De Grauwe, Paul, and Ji, Yuemei (2012) 
'Mispricing of sovereign risk and multiple equilibria in the Eurozone', Centre for European Policy Working Paper 361.
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national financial institutions to finance their expenditures.  Despite these developments, the current 
re-domestication of government debt holding does not appear to be an unseen phenomenon, nor a 
direct return to the pre-EMU situation. Among countries of the euro area, only Spain has today a level of  
sovereign  debt  held  by  residents  (including  central  banks  and  financial  corporations)  higher  than  
before it joined the euro.
The huge exposure of government towards their banking system is therefore not a phenomenon that  
was born during the crisis but is a well-established feature of European economies since the 1980s. 
Nevertheless,  what  is  true  on  average  is  not  necessarily  true  on  an  individual  basis.  Ireland  and  
Portugal for instance, have experienced a dramatic increase in this ratio from 2006 to 2011 while in  
Germany, Belgium and France, on the contrary, the financial crisis has not stopped a downward trend in  
the  domestic  holding  of  government  debt.  These  trends  are  characterised  by  a  strong  path  
dependency, which supports the argument that historical trends are still important for the structure of  
bank holdings. 
A second aspect of these changing landscapes is the evolution in the centrality of central banks in the 
European national financial ecosystems. This role had significantly been curtailed after the demise of  
Bretton Woodswith the creation of the Eurosystem, the centralisation of key central prerogatives within 
the ECB and the emergence of principle of central bank independence. However, during the current  
crisis, with growing financial fragmentation, impaired transmission mechanisms, the European Central  
Bank  was  forced  to  take  a  more  active  role  to  repair  transmission  channels  and  it  contributed  to 
increase the holding of government bonds held by central banks of the Eurosystem. This modification 
of its collateral framework also allowed National Central Banks to exert some discretion in the types of  
claims they could accept as collateral which may have increased the national bias in the refinancing of 
credit claims28.
These  dynamics  have  provoked  a  vivid  reaction  denouncing  both  financial  repression  and  “fiscal  
dominance”29 of  central  banks  but  these  criticisms  seem  to  ignore  the  fact  that  the  most  striking  
feature  of  European  national  central  banks’  balance  sheet  expansion  is  not  the  result  of  greater  
accumulation of public debt but rather of an historically unprecedented increase in central bank credit  
to the private economy. Central  bank balance sheet usually  increased during wars and recessions 
mostly  to  ease  government  financing.  After  1945,  some  central  banks  became  more  involved  in  
28 Merler, Silvia, and Pisani-Ferry, Jean (2011) 'Hazardous tango: sovereign-bank interdependence and financial stability 
in the euro area', Financial Stability Review, (16), 201-210.
29 In a 25 November 2013 speech, J. Weidmann said that “Monetary policy runs the risk of becoming subject to financial 
and fiscal dominance”, see http://www.bis.org/review/r131126b.pdf.
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directed  credit  and  used  their  balance  sheet  to  finance  long-term  investment  and  influence  the  
allocation of credit through re-discount privileges and choices. However, even in the central banks that  
used these techniques extensively such as France, the ratio of central bank’s claim on the domestic  
banking sector never really exceeded 8-10 percent of GDP. In the euro area, it has now reached more  
than 30 percent of GDP. This contrasts starkly with the UK and the US where the Bank of England and  
the Fed assets purchase were largely government and quasi-government liabilities30.
Arguably,  a  large  part  of  these claims,  are  in  reality  claims  on the financial  sector  caused  by  the  
extension of large amounts of liquidity to the banking sector. Indeed, never in history did central banks  
support an entire financial  system to this extent. While the UK stands out here as having provided 
relatively little liquidity support to its banking sector beyond purchase of government bonds, the ECB,  
on the contrary, has accumulated claims to the banking sector by a record amount. In 2011, central  
bank claims on the banking sector in the euro area was 30 percent of GDP, ranging from 0.1 percent for  
the Bank of Finland to 68.7 percent for the Bank of Ireland. Interestingly, those central banks that have  
the least  government debt,  tend to have the most claims on the private sector thereby potentially  
revealing important differences in the structures of national ecosystems.
The  intervention  of  central  banks  in  the  financial  sector  has  further  been  increased  by  the  
acknowledgement  that  macro-prudential  regulation  is  a  necessary  complement  to  modern  central 
banking. The new macroprudential mandate acquired granted during the crisis to central banks is in 
part a return to the theory and practice of central banking 30 years ago in Europe (even though the  
term “macroprudential” was coined recently) when central bankers thought their role extended well  
beyond the narrow remit of monetary policy.
A third significant evolution in the relationship between governments and the financial system that has  
in part turned the clock back can be found in the return of “public credit institutions” (also known as  
“development banks”). These state-owned lenders in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, respectively  
the Caisse des dépôts et consignations (CDC),  the  Kreditanstalt  für  Wiederaufbau (KfW),  the Cassa 
depositi  e prestiti  (CDP) and the  Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) have considerably increased their 
scope as of recently. The CDC and CDP are old state owned institutions (created respectively in 1816 
and 1863) that played an important historical role in the economic development of France and Italy.  
The KfW was created in 1948 to support the reconstruction of the German economy while the Spanish  
ICO is  more recent (1971).  Their  role in the economy has increased greatly  and rapidly during the  
30 For example, speech by David Miles from the BoE: 'Government debt and unconventional monetary policy', at the 28th 
NABE Economic Policy Conference, Virginia, 26 March 2012.
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financial crisis.While total assets of the credit institutions of the Euro Area increased by only 4 percent 
from 2008 to 2012, assets of public credit institutions increased by at least 30 percent and even 128 
percent for the ICO. These institutions have also, together with the European Investment Bank, which  
has also expanded its lending activities quite substantially by 56 percent over the same period (2008-
2012), collectively created the “long-term investors” club to promote their role in the economy as a 
provider of long term financing31.
The detailed balance sheets of these institutions show that they have performed various functions over  
time  with  different  emphasis  in  each  country.  The  Cassa  de  Depositi  e  Prestiti  for  example  has  
expanded its credits to the public sector tremendously, extending some €85bn worth of loans to public 
(mainly local) entities and purchasing some €90bn in Italian government bonds and bills. In France,  
the CDC has repositioned its  portfolios  away from European peripheral  countries’  debt  into  French  
sovereign debt where the exposure almost doubled. The CNP insurances company, which is the 6 th 
European insurance company in assets size and which is owned by the CDC, has also accomplished a  
similar portfolio rebalancing towards domestic debt.
Meanwhile, in Germany, KfW played a quite different role by first being largely used to provide capital,  
loans and guarantees to the financial sector32 during the first wave of the crisis in particular in the case 
of IKB. It also expanded its financing to local SME and infrastructure in Germany and abroad. Indeed,  
the KfW played an important role in German financial aid to other European countries as in Greece with 
some €22bn of outstanding credits at the end of 2011, Italy with some €1.7bn, Ireland with €1.4bn, 
Spain  with  €3.2bn.  These  institutions  are  therefore  not  only  important  to  understand  the  political  
economy of national eco-systems but also of new financial relationships between European nations  
during the crisis. Indeed, in Spain for instance, KfW lends to Spanish SMEs through the ICO. It is also  
interesting to observe that the countries that did not have an important “development bank” (such as 
Portugal and Greece) are now in the process of creating one33.
In essence, the existence of these institutions has allowed reactivating practices and mechanisms of  
intrusion in the intermediation system that were an essential part of the financial ecosystem over the 
last century. Their role is probably even reinforced in European countries today by the fact that national  
31 The long-term investors club: http://www.ltic.org/. See also green paper by the European Commission on long-term 
finance: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/financing-growth/long-term/index_en.htm.
32 Between the end of 2007 and February 2008, IKB had to go through several rounds of financial support in which banks 
and the KfW agreed to two more bailout packages, which ended up increasing KfW’s participation in IKB from 38 percent 
to 90.8 percent. For more details see Cornelia Woll (2014) The Power of Collective Inaction: Bank Bailouts in 
Comparison, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
33 'Germany to help Spain with cheap loans', EUObserver, 28 May 2013, http://euobserver.com/economic/120278.
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central  banks and governments cannot  provide direct  public  support  or  target  specific  sectors  via 
subsidised loans as they used to do in the immediate post war period. In many countries (but not in all)  
national credit institutions never really disappeared, they just blended in. The CDC’s total assets for  
instance  represent  15  percent  of  GDP  in  2012  when  it  was  equal  to  17  percent  of  GDP  in  1970.  
Governments for the most part therefore never really disbanded the institutions they had built of the 
last century and they proved relatively easy to awaken and mobilise as the crisis hit.
Contrary to Carmen Reinhart’s argument, it is misleading to these developments as a mere “return of 
financial repression”34. The intervention of European states in their financial system have not intended  
to become substitute for fiscal or industrial policy and thus differ drastically from historical quantitative 
tools used by central banks thirty years ago. Nonetheless, it is clear that the greater re-nationalisation  
in the holding of public debt by domestic financial institution, the unprecedented increase in central  
bank credit to the private economy, and the return of public credit institutions are three developments  
since the financial crisis that have reaffirmed the centrality of distinct European financial ecosystems 
after two decades in which these ties had been eroded by financial liberalisation and the process of  
European monetary integration.  
5. EUROPEAN FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEMS AND THE MOVE TOWARDS A BANKING UNION
The previous section has discussed how the changes in the patterns of financial intermediation and 
sovereign debt holding emerged in response to the crisis, but the implications of these trends extends 
well beyond economics  and deep into the political arena and the debate concerning the reform in the 
European financial architecture. 
The long and troubled history of  the  construction  of  an  integrated market  for  financial  services in  
Europe has often been described as a “battle of the systems” across different European countries, in  
particular between systems such as Britain where capital markets played a key role as the main source  
of financing and the continent where banks dominated the provision of credit35. But on the continent 
itself,   national  practices  and  structures  also  differ  greatly  and  are  somewhat  embedded  in  the 
domestic institutions and possibly in different varieties of capitalism36.
The realisation of an integrated financial market encouraged first by the Banking Directive in 1977, the  
34 Reinhart, C. M. (2012) 'The return of financial repression', Financial Stability Review, 16, 37-48.
35 Story, Jonathan, and Walter, Ingo (1997) Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems, 
MIT Press.
36 Hall, Peter and Soskice, David (2001) Varieties Of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 
Oxford University Press.
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Single European act in 1986 and the Lamfalussy Report in 2001 had partially redesigned the fault lines 
in  European  financial  policies.  The  traditional  conflicts  across  different  countries  reflecting  the 
preferences of their national champions was complemented by the emergence of coalitions of large  
pan-European groups with a strong interest in removing obstacles to the emergence of an integrated  
financial market for financial services in Europe, often pitted against firms with a more local or national  
outlook threatened by this trend.
The dynamics triggered by the financial crisis have reinforced the channels of pressure and influence  
between European governments and their banking systems. The greater nationalisation of financial  
intermediation as well as the wave of re-regulation revive strong national preferences and tensions in  
the design of financial  policies.  Debates surrounding the design and implementation of Basel III for 
example,  have instead witnessed the re-emergence of traditional  national  cleavages,  with different 
European  regulatory  authorities  frequently  running  in  support  of  their  banking  industry  at  the  
negotiating  table.  The  violent  realisation  that  the  monetary  union  did  imply  lesser  avenues  for  
economic adjustment in  response to shocks has certainly  strengthened the reluctance of national 
governments to deprive themselves of policy levers to influence credit intermediation. On the other  
hand,  the  financial  sector  seems  to  have  been  able  to  use  this  dependency  in  order  to  extract  
concessions from national regulatory authorities that would serve its own interests. The influence of  
financial industry groups over the position of their respective governments has not been confined to  
countries with large financial sectors, but it has been pervasive also in countries where the financial  
industry occupies a smaller position in the economy37.
The path towards a banking union – a single supervisory mechanism applying a single rulebook and 
eventually  a  single  resolution  mechanism  –  is  therefore  particularly  important  in  this  respect.  If  
successful, it should precipitate a profound redefinition of national financial ecosystems in Europe and  
have broader consequences on the underlying structure of financial  intermediation in Europe.  This 
may not be completely compatible with sustaining national preferences as far as the organisation of  
the financial system is concerned. But it could also reduce the ability of member states to use their  
financial  system to play a cushioning role in the event of economic downturns.  This could imply a 
further reduction in the ability of member state to stabilise their  economies and entail  much more 
radical changes in the structures of national capitalisms. The tensions existing between these changes  
and  the  historical  ties  between  different  governments  and  their  banking  systems  explain  the 
opposition  of  domestic  financial  interests  and  some  national  governments  have  been  source  of  
37 Howarth, David, and Quaglia, Lucia (2013) 'Banking on Stability: The Political Economy of New Capital Requirements in  
the European Union', Journal of European Integration (May), 37–41; Bruegel blogpost by Nicolas Veron: 
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1019-basel-iii-europes-interest-is-to-comply/.
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resistance on the way for the establishment of a banking union. The resilience of history within national  
financial  ecosystems  and  the  symbiotic  relationships  remaining  between  western  European 
governments  and  their  national  banking  systems  are  a  key  factor  shaping  the  path  towards  the  
Europeanisation in the regulation, supervision, resolution of the financial sector that the banking union  
entails.  Will  the union break national ties,  create a new balance of public and private power at  the  
European level or, on the contrary reinforce domestic specificities and relationships such that a dual  
system  might  emerge with  two  separate  levels  of  activities  and  political  economies (national  and 
European)? There is a wide research agenda ahead as very little has been written up to now on the  
potential  consequences  of  the  banking  union  for  the  political  economy  of  national  financial 
ecosystems. The debate has not even fully started and insights from economics, history and political  
sciences are more than needed at this stage.
6. CONCLUSION
Despite their renewed popularity among economists and policymakers since 2008, neither the notions  
of “capture” nor “financial repression” appear sufficient to fully understand today’s European dynamic  
and  complex  patterns  that  characterise  the  relationship  between  governments  and  their  financial  
industries at the national and increasingly at the European level.
These seem to be evolving profoundly in two directions. First an apparent rapid reduction of banks’  
balance sheets that will probably increase the role of non-banks in the provision of credit and thereby 
certainly  affect  profoundly  the  ties  between  banks and  government  insofar  as  they  influence  the  
extension and allocation and credit to the economy. Second, and maybe more importantly, the ongoing 
process of Europeanisation of financial policy is likely to have profound ramifications for both financial  
ecosystems themselves and for the relationships that governments and financial institutions develop.  
In particular, it could be expected that relationships that were so far developed within the confines of  
national borders would be gradually transferred over the to the European level via the process of the  
banking union, thereby side-lining or at least minimising the importance of national governments.
However, developments in the last few years very much question this notion as it appears clearly that 
the financial crisis has actually awakened institutions, practices and relations that have strengthened 
the ties between governments and their respective financial ecosystems. Starting from the breadth and 
scope of financial support38, to the reactivation of certain supervisory and even monetary practices, the 
ties between national governments and the banking system has been in many ways reactivated in a 
38 Woll (2014). See footnote 32.
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way that tends to blur the rigid categories of capture and repression. As a result, a more nuanced prism  
is  needed,  focusing  on  agency that  national  specificities  will  be  able  to  develop  within  European 
contexts  as  well  as  on  the non-trivial  equilibria  between public  and  private  interests.  The political  
science literature, which has highlighted the existence and persistence of “varieties of capitalism” in  
Europe and the resilience of national ecosystems, will be particularly helpful in this respect. This strand 
of work should also help us to introduce the perspective brought by the political economy literature in  
the debates about the European monetary union over and above the importance of the need for  a  
banking union as a necessary stabilising feature of the single currency.
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